THE GEO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE AMERICAN STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

THE GEO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE AMERICAN STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

-Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria*

The US policy has always exhibited a deep sense of insecurity and quest for materialistic gains along with its self acquired role of acting as an universal policeman - the need for which is sometimes real but most of the time imaginary, bordering on ‘paranoia.’ Moreover, the American engine has always needed an extraneous threat to set it in motion. Previously, it was the communist threat. Now it is the threat posed by the ‘ungoverned states’. The sources of concern today are the states with large tracts of ungoverned territories like Afghanistan which offer ample opportunities to further its interests under the garb of international obligations. The situation in Afghanistan offers fertile ground for the US and the September 11, 2001 incident provided it with the reason to decipher its ambition. Although, Afghanistan has gone from one of Washington’s greatest foreign policy triumphs to one of its most profound failures. During the Cold War, U.S. support to the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance resulted in a debacle for Moscow, humiliating the vaunted Red Army and discrediting the Soviets throughout the Muslim world. After the Soviets withdrew, however, Afghanistan has proved to be a disaster for U.S. policy, especially in its second endeavour after September 11, 2001.

 

The geo-political dynamics of this country with a strategic location has led the policy makers in Washington to show ample interest and be involved in its affairs like it has been in the cold war period. The American interest in Afghanistan post Soviet invasion in 1979 was guided initially by a purely short term, tactical and emotive agenda to seek ‘historical revenge’ for Vietnam. However, once the Soviets withdrew, their interest in Central Asia suddenly revived and peaked due to the quest for the estimated 70 billion tons of oil reserves of Central Asia. The American geo-political drive also appears to be motivated by the containment/engagement of China, Iran and extracting Central Asian oil and gas for the world market, in addition to putting the NATO right there at the door-step of Russia. With 9/11 attack, it realized to its chagrin & shock that the rabidly fundamentalist Al-Qaeda & Taliban, their own creation, struck them with a vicious force that shook them beyond their realms of imagination. It is now engaged in waging a war on terrorism with the help of an International force (ISAF), mainly NATO and has pledged a vast sum for the reconstruction work in Afghanistan.

 

INTRODUCTION

 

Afghanistan can be characterized geographically as a mountainous desert interspersed with isolated fertile valleys, river basins and oases. It extends eastward from the Iranian plateau and incorporates the foothills of the Himalayan ranges, which rise to a height of 7470 meters in the finger of land that divides Tajikistan from Pakistan and touches on Western China. To the North of this range, known as the Hindu Kush, begin the plains that cross the Afghan frontier at the Amu Darya river and stretch for thousands of miles across Central Asia and the Russian steppes to the Arctic. To the South of the Hindu Kush is a bleak and windswept desert that passes through Pakistan to the Indian Ocean. More importantly, Afghanistan has an important geo-strategic location, connecting Middle East, Central and South Asia.

 

It provides a land bridge to Central Asia’s vast oil and natural gas deposits. It is completely landlocked and only 30,000 sq km out of 6, 47,500 sq km is irrigated land. 31.75% people are literate & unemployment ranges from 40-60%. It stands at 174^th rank in terms of Human Resource Development Index in the world. In recent estimates by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 52% of the nation's GDP, amounting to $2.7 billion annually, is generated by the drug trade. Some 3.3 million Afghans are involved in producing opium (90% of world cultivation). It has a railway network of only 24.6 km and a road network of 21,000 km most of which has been reconstructed recently. Out of 45 airports only 10 have paved runways. It is clearly one of the more under-developed countries and the only positive indicator is the growing telephone network which stood at 15,000 fixed line telephones in 2001 has now grown to 4.5 million including the cellular network due to the reconstruction effort.

 

THE GEO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS

 

We all are aware of the role of the regional actors in Afghanistan and the resulting ‘muddle’ since the Soviet Invasion, the consequent civil war, the Bonn Agreement and  the ‘Afghanistan Compact’.  Some important issues that emerge which are worth taking note are:-

 

(a)        Afghanistan's strategic location at the "fault line", of four civilizations¹ - Islamic, Russian Orthodox, Chinese and Hindu – which has arguably been a significant factor for the region’s instability.

 

(b)        Afghanistan's internal political fragility and external vulnerability continues to exist due to the country's fragmented social structure and rule of warlords and their linkage to regional actors.

 

(c)        The existence of terrorist groups in Pakistan, many of them backed by elements of the country's military and fundamentalist Islamic groups like the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-­Islam which remain as the forces of instability both in Pakistan and   Afghanistan - even in the face of Pakistan's apparent crackdown².

 

(d)        Central Asia's huge oil and gas deposits continue to provide incentives to the regional actors including Russia who strive for their say in the region's geo-politics. That remains as an impediment in the region's political development vis-à-vis the US military presence.

 

(e)        Afghanistan's ethnic linkages and geo-political ‘susceptibility’ with neighbouring countries - Pakistan, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran – which continue to haunt the country despite American military presence and that in turn will probably prolong the United States' presence.³

 

A retrospective analysis of Washington's policy towards the pre - 9/11 Afghanistan shows that the United States was ready to accept the fundamentalist regime of Taliban to further its geo-political ambition (oil and natural resources as probable incentives) in the region. The geo-strategic argument was that since the Taliban was pro-Pakistani, and at the same time anti-Russian and anti-Iranian, the United States ought to accept it. As per this argument, it was not an American affair to ascertain how the Taliban treats its own people, or to cater to "a stable Afghanistan with an aesthetically challenged government than a convulsed Afghanistan that offers a playground for Iranian and Russian devilments.” Nevertheless, the US hoped that after long years of turmoil, the Taliban would unite the country. A Sunni-dominated government in Kabul would serve as a bulwark against the influence of Iran in the region. There are also reports that the US is using Pakistani guerilla groups such as Jundullah to launch attacks on military and civilian bases in Iran⁴.

 

The containment of Iran had become an American strategy in the region, especially, after the Teheran government declared its readiness to extend port facilities to the newly independent Central Asian Republics. American interests in Afghanistan also increased when it became clear that the Rabbani government in Kabul had been drawn closer to Teheran, after the killing of Iran-backed Shia leader Abdul Ali Mazari by the Taliban in early 1995. What was more alarming for the Americans and the Pakistani intelligence agencies was the Iranian diplomatic success in bringing together of the erstwhile enemies of the Afghan war, Rabbani and Hekmatyar in an agreement in June 1996.

 

Afghanistan, being a transport-junction and land-approach between the Land-locked countries of Central Asia and the littoral states of the Indian Ocean, will remain strategically important⁴. Therefore, the competition over control of trade and pipeline routes from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea (Indian Ocean) transformed relations between Iran and Pakistan, and Teheran's initiative in this respect was openly supported by Russia and India. Taliban's ability to provide security for trade, and the projected pipelines was considered strategically advantageous to both Islamabad and Washington. Significantly, around this time, in the spring of 1996, a partnership between the American company UNOCAL and the Saudi Company DELTA had concluded plans for a multimillion-dollar ($2 billion) oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to Pakistani Baluchistan via Herat and Kandahar. Pakistan with the American backing (as an American company got involved) and Saudi Arabia considered the deal very lucrative since it was not just the trade route, but potential oil and gas pipelines were at stake. It was visualized that the, Taliban’s most important function was to provide "security for roads, and potentially, oil and gas pipelines that would link the states of Central Asia to the international market through Pakistan rather than through Iran.”⁵

 

It may be noted that the US was appeasing the Taliban at a time when the fundamentalist militia was training the Kashmiri, Uzbek, Tajik and Uighur radicals; thus spurring the growth of destabilizing fundamentalist movements throughout the region. But the hand-in-glove relationship could not last long as the real colours of Taliban came out soon. After the bombing of the American embassies in Dar-e-Salaam in Tanzania and Nairobi in Kenya in1998 by Al Qaeda, however, Washington had to review its Afghanistan policy, while continuing its regional drive on a broad strategic setup.

 

 

 

U.S. STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

 

The situation inside Afghanistan appears far from being rosy due to the current strategy being followed by the United States and its NATO partners which does not inspire confidence that Afghanistan will soon do better. President Hamid Karzai or his successor will need more help from the international community to have a decent chance of avoiding future instability in his country and gradually improving the lives of Afghans. Apart from this, Pakistan (a functional anarchy) is in the grip of one of its worst political crisis in recent years. The key components of the American perspective may be analysed as under:

 

The Light Foot print Policy                                                   

 

Lakhdar Brahimi, the first post-9/11 UN Special Representative for Afghanistan and the main architect of the Bonn Conference is the man behind the ‘Light Footprint’ policy. Bob Woodward reports in Bush at War that when the CIA analysts discussed the US options in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 'the general rule was to study what the Soviets had done and do the opposite'. As the Soviets had committed a large number of troops, it was decided to avoid doing that and instead rely on a small number of Special Forces, aerial bombardments and the anti-Taliban Afghan militias⁶.

Thus, the initial 'light footprint' policy was as much owing to this fear of repeating the Soviet mistakes as to the subsequent need of personnel and equipments for the war in Iraq. Although the number of American and Allied Forces gradually increased from a few hundred in the late 2001 to a few thousand in 2002, to about 10 000 in 2003 and to over 20 000 in October 2004 (during the Presidential election in Afghanistan); it was never sufficient to root out remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. There is little doubt that the lack of dependable security forces around the country gave rise to 'war lord-ism' and problems of law and order that contributed to the resurgence of the Taliban. The treatment of the captured Taliban by the Northern Alliance, especially by General Dostum forces, added another incentive for many people to join the Taliban. Taliban prisoners of war (POWs) were treated very inhumanely⁷, and it is alleged that thousands of them died while being transported in overcrowded containers from Kunduz to Dostum's headquarters in Sheberghan. The low-ranking Taliban, who did not attract much attention, failed to find meaningful jobs or means of livelihood either in Afghanistan or in the refugee camps. Thus, when the Taliban leadership reorganized itself and started recruitment, they found a fertile ground among the former members of the movement.

The trigger happy ISAF and the American troops while carrying out aerial bombardments ended up killing hundreds of civilians⁸, thus alienating themselves from the local populace. Lack of understanding of the local culture and sensibilities coupled with human rights abuse and torture of the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay fuelled sympathy for the rising Talibans⁹. Further the external forces and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are operating without consulting or respecting the sentiments of the Kabul Government.

If we add to this the weaknesses of Karzai viz, his own personality, factionalism within the government, questionable appointments, questionable legitimacy, rampant corruption, slow progress in reconstruction and human development, slow progress in creating an army and police force, narcotic drug problem and negative impacts of the free market economic policy have created an unacceptable situation in Afghanistan¹⁰. The policy of the American troops to negotiate with the local warlords while keeping the Kabul Government in dark has boosted the growth of ‘war-lordism’ once again and has also undermined the authority of the Karzai Government¹¹. The situation has improved in Afghan’s capital-Kabul. But most rural parts of the country, where majority of Afghans live, remains beyond Mr. Karzai's control.

The Surge & Negotiate Policy

The "surge first, then negotiate" plan of Barrack Obama¹²  is to build up security in Afghan cities with new US troop arrivals before initiating talks with the Taliban. For the talks to be successful, the US intends to squeeze the Taliban first, including by taking another page from its Iraq experiment and setting up lightly trained local militias in every provincial district. The crux of the policy is to bring down violence by cutting deals to keep Taliban intact as a fighting force, with active ties with the Pakistani military. The move ignores the danger that such militias could terrorize local populations. If a resurgent Taliban is now on the offensive, with 2008 proving to be the deadliest year for US forces, it is primarily because of two reasons: The sustenance the Taliban still draws from Pakistan; and a growing Pashtun backlash against foreign intervention. A US surge will not intimidate local Taliban commanders and tribal chieftains to negotiate peace deals, especially when some countries with forces in Afghanistan are exhibiting war fatigue and a desire to pull out troops. Indeed, it is naive to expect an Iraq-style surge-and-bribe experiment to work in Afghanistan, whose mountainous terrain, myriad tribes, patterns of shifting tribal and ethnic loyalties, special status as the global hub of poppy trade and a history of internecine civil conflict set it apart from any other Muslim country.

In such a land with a long tradition of humbling foreign armies, pay-offs won't buy peace. Yet, the US champions a 21st-century version of a divide-and-conquer imperial strategy. If there is any certainty, it is that the US plan will help the already-entrenched Taliban sharpen its claws. However, to help justify "surge and bribe"¹³, a distinction is being drawn between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to portray the former as evil and the latter as a different force with whom a compromise ought to be pursued. The blunt fact is that Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani military-reared organizations like the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad now constitute a difficult-to-separate mix of jihad-spouting soul mates with safe havens in Pakistan. A deal with any one such group will only strengthen the global-jihad syndicate, plus the Pakistani military.

"Surge and bribe" is a short-sighted approach intent on repeating the very mistakes of American policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past three decades that have come to haunt US security and that of the rest of the free world. If America is to reclaim the global fight against terror, it will need to face up to the lessons from its past policies that gave rise to Franken steins like Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar and to "the state within the Pakistani state", the directorate of ISI, made powerful in the 1980s as a conduit of covert US aid for anti-Soviet Afghan guerrillas.

The primary lesson is to keep the focus on long-term interests and not be carried away by political expediency. Yet again, Washington is itching to give primacy to near-term considerations. Even if “in the best-case scenario” the Obama administration managed to bring down violence in Afghanistan by cutting deals that would keep the Taliban intact as a fighting force, with active ties to the Pakistani military. Such a tactical gain would exact serious costs on regional and international security¹⁴. In seeking such short-term success, the Obama team is falling prey to a long-standing US policy weakness: The pursuit of narrow objectives without much regard for the security of friends¹⁵.

 

At the same time, Afghanistan's neighbours have apprehensions on what they call the US grand design. They perceive that the US is now well entrenched with all its military might in the entire region and that it is not going to go back any time soon. And that the American geo-political drive is motivated by the containment of China, Iran and extracting Central Asian oil and gas to the world market, in addition to putting the NATO right there in the door-step of Russia¹⁶. As per this argument, American strategists believe that it would be convenient for them to deal with an unruly China and Iran while based in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Washington can have a close watch on the developments of the communist China and the unruly Iran, and the position would give access to more strategic mileage to the US foreign policy interests in the geo-politics of the region. Secondly, as stated above, through its military presence and economic and political support in the Central Asian Republics, Washington hopes to get access to the regions tremendous untapped reserves of oil.

ROLE OF REGIONAL POWERS

These strategic and geo-political ambitions of the United States have led to considerable resentment among the countries surrounding the region. Russian, Chinese, and Iranian unhappiness is particularly visible in this context. In order to keep the Americans away from their "dirty games" in the region¹⁷, these countries will continue to support the ethnic and tribal groups through whom they consider to promote their own geo-strategic interests. For instance, Chinese will continue to be perturbed by expanding US presence on its southwestern frontiers and support the anti-US forces; Russians to Tajiks and Uzbeks; and Iranians to their Shia minority ethnic group in the northwestern part of the country. Because these countries perceive that through its military presence in the region, the United States is unduly interfering in their "sphere of influence."

In this sense, the overarching American geo- political objective in the region will be kept off balance by the regional powers, and that will continue to keep Afghanistan fragile and fragmented. In the process, America might get bogged down militarily in this landlocked country that has a long history of fighting against the foreigners. Despite some high-handedness on terrorism and religious extremism, the regional actors complain that the US was not responding fully to the terrorist threat because it was not affecting the US interests directly. Leaders of Afghanistan's neighbours have pointed fingers at the US for its "selective approach" and "double standards."¹⁸ They view that while the enduring American military presence in Afghanistan and the region is not going to eliminate the specter of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, the menace provided a good pretext to the US entrenching itself in the region.

U.S. ANTI-INSURGENCY POLICY

 

The United States does not still have an Anti-insurgency policy in place primarily because like any other traditional State Army, it was meant to win Wars and not to fight Insurgency in the first place. But then a pertinent question arises that perhaps in its exuberance to react instantly, was the U.S. notion of dealing with insurgency flawed?

 

Let us examine the implications of an Insurgency operation where the U.S. Army is involved. In order to undertake the challenge, the old cold war mindset deserves a re-look.  There seems to be a view that a relentless attack against Islamic insurgents wherever they surface should be waged. The view is as seemingly logical as the Cold War belief in a worldwide communist conspiracy for global domination — and just as wrong. The belief is also harmful, for four major reasons. First, as in the Cold War, the belief in a global insurgency can lead the United States to make local commitments on the basis of vague overarching global principles. This commits America to send more troops, sustain greater military casualties, and spend more money than it possibly could in multiple conflicts at times and place of the insurgents' choosing. Second, a U.S.-led global counterinsurgency makes it more difficult for the United States to defeat insurgencies. Successful counterinsurgents fight as patriots in the service of their own country — not as United States clients. Third, equipping the Americans with a mindset that places prominence on the global common features of insurgencies at the expense of fine-textured local features makes the U.S. military less effective in combating insurgencies. Fourth, belief in a global counterinsurgency leads to mismanagement of counterinsurgency campaigns because it undercuts the leadership of governments allied with the United States and of American military commanders battling an insurgency. So, the larger lesson is to retain the clarity of a "local" versus "global" perspective and to selectively apply the lessons of previous successful campaigns in similar asymmetric conflicts.

Here, it would be interesting to analyze the politics of asymmetric conflicts and to figure out on the basis of the pre-theoretical perspective of Andrew Mack as to Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars? ¹⁹

The key facets of his thesis are:

•      That Conventional wisdom that military superiority prevails in this war has been destroyed as the constraints on mobilization are political, not material. In none of the conflicts noted was more than a fraction of the total potential military resources of the external power in fact mobilized.

•      The theatre of war extends beyond to encompass the polity and social institutions of the external power-full mobilization not possible as it also increases domestic costs.

•      Direct costs become of strategic importance when translated into indirect costs - psychological and political as the aim of the insurgents is not the destruction of the military capability of their opponents as an end in itself.

•      Dissent permitted in ‘open societies’ is an obstacle. The totalitarian societies are not troubled by the domestic constraints which U.S. faced on Vietnam.

•      The progressively greater human, economic and political costs give rise to “war weariness”. The last years of the Vietnam conflict were marked by troop mutinies, widespread drug addiction, high levels of desertion, and even the murders of over-zealous officers’ intent on sending their men on dangerous patrols. 

It can be appreciated that the postulates propounded by Mack are valid and applicable in all prolonged asymmetric conflicts including the ongoing one in Afghanistan. Mack concludes with a lesson for the Governments (of U.S. and NATO countries in this case) which have committed themselves for such conflicts that they should realize that, over time, the costs of the conflict will inevitably generate widespread opposition at home. The causes of such a dissent lie in the structure of conflict itself – in the type of conflict being pursued and in the asymmetries which form its distinctive character.   Henry Kissinger has correctly observed on the War in Vietnam that “We lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerilla warfare that the guerilla wins if he does not lose & Conventional Army loses if it does not win”.²⁰ It seems that the lessons should once again be remembered if the U.S. and NATO extend their campaign in Afghanistan. Today, when the United States is being asked to increase its level of commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan as a means of stabilizing the country, even as American troops battle the resurgent Islamic extremists who operate along the Afghan-Pakistan border, the key question especially in the wake of World economic recession is no longer whether to withdraw but rather when and how.  

THE ROAD AHEAD

Barrack Obama after assuming office had made a pleasing statement to the ears of Indian strategists that all aid to Pakistan will be linked to its performance in aiding and cooperating in the war against terror. Joe Biden, the Vice-President of USA had made a trip to Afghanistan just before the Presidential Inauguration and has also declared that it won’t hesitate to hit specific targets in Pakistan especially in the safe havens in Dir, Swat valley and the region of FATA should there be hard intelligence available. This had raised the hackles of the Pakistani establishment and they tried their level best to make America rethink and were finally successful in extracting aid without strings - a dangerous development which has the potential to destabilize the region. Hence, ‘Mission AFPAK’ will need all the diplomatic, military and economic might of America & all the regional players to succeed. Does America follow the Zero Sum Game or  Washington re-hyphenates the relationship in such a way that Pakistan gets a ‘Soft Landing’ and simultaneously engages New Delhi at a much higher level than before befitting an emerging Superpower remains to be seen.

Richard Holbrooke’s feedback and recommendations should help President Obama unfold his terms of engagement in future. Also there appears to be shift in America’s policy towards Iran and it should be a positive change that must be welcomed by all the regional players. It is imperative that US deals with Pakistan with an iron hand if it has to achieve success in the strife torn region. By naming a separate envoy for Pakistan & Afghanistan Mr. Richard  Holbrooke, without apparently linking the Kashmir issue as of now, Obama seems to follow a policy that may help its new strategic partner viz. India follow its own game strategy  in the region.

The January 2006 London conference, attended by more than sixty countries and international agencies produced a document called "Afghanistan Compact." The document predicated on every aspect of Afghanistan's social and economic development. Some of the suggestions given by the Afghan Study Group operating under the aegis of The Centre for the Study of the Presidency²¹ released in Jan 2008 also outlined the critical issues to be addressed by the US and its NATO partners which are related to International coordination, security, governance and the rule of law, counter-narcotics, economic development and reconstruction, and Afghanistan and its neighbours.

But, on the country's security challenges, Pakistan was not even named in connection with the growing insurgency. Instead, the Compact called for "full respect of Afghanistan's sovereignty, and strengthening dialogue and cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbours." The prime worry in Afghanistan is extremism of the kind which is continuing for a long time and these forces usually feed on political instability which to a large extent can be attributed to forces in Pakistan.

With this background, some issues and recommendations can be outlined which should be taken into account for Stabilizing Afghanistan by adoption of viable, practical & workable options: taking lessons from past counter-insurgency operations which may be enumerated as under:

•      Indigenous forces eventually have to win the war on their own, they must be developed with the capacity to do so

•      Concentrate on the main aim of neutralising Al- Qaeda and Taliban- countering Sanctuary in Pakistan

•      Increase funds for rebuilding Infrastructure - ‘Reconstruction light’

•       Restrained use of force in Civilian areas-not “Clear by Fire” tactics

•      Understand the Local culture- family, clan, and tribal ties with concepts such as revenge and honour with less attachment and respect for the centralized state government

•      Establish a regional approach to Afghanistan with the aid of UN and neighbouring countries: encourage Pak-Afghan Border to be settled

CONCLUSION

 

Bringing about a normal situation in this war-ravaged country will depend on how the United States acts in the coming days. The present trend does not look conducive to permanent peace in the country. The American peace efforts so far appear fragile, and the country is passing through a thin edge of instability as it is still being haunted by so many divisive and centrifugal forces. Afghanistan remains critical to the future of its neighbours, as instability in this land-locked country has the potential to destabilize the whole region. A potent combination of drugs, weapons, and militants traverse Afghanistan and cross into its neighbours and beyond, and hence, the seeds of instability remain intact²². The Bonn process, reconstruction of the country and its national security are not intrinsic to Afghan situation alone. It is in fact, heavily loaded with regional geopolitics. And within this geo-political entanglement, the regional actors look at the US presence with suspicion. As stated above, many believe that the geo-political factors such as Central Asia/Caspian energy resources; China's Xingjian, Iran, etc are the reasons for US interest in Afghanistan. And, if that is the case, and the United States remains bogged down in a growing insurgency in the country, and if the US missiles take more innocent lives, Washington's strategy could well backfire²³.

This is the Centre of Gravity of the problem and unless a suitable End Game is not played out, the desired End state where the regional aspirations are fulfilled satisfactorily, may remain elusive. The Bonn process, reconstruction of the country under Afghan Compact and its national security are not intrinsic to Afghan situation alone. It is in fact, heavily loaded with regional geopolitics. And within this geo-political entanglement, the regional and non regional actors especially the US have to play their part decisively, proactively and positively.

We must have optimism for Afghanistan- Afghans want Security and Hope which they deserve after about 30 years of near-constant war but realism says it will take time.

REFERENCES

 

1. Huntington Samuel P, The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of the World Order, Viking Penguin Books India, 1996.
2. Giustozzi, A. (2008) Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. New York: Columbia University Press
3. Ibid.
4. Barnett R Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995.
5. Barnett R Rubin, Still Ours to Lose: Afghanistan on the Brink, Council on Foreign Relations, September 21, 2006.
6. Najibullah Lafraie, Resurgence of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: How and why? Department of Politics, University of Otago, PO Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New Zealand.
7. Rohde, D. and Sanger, D.E. (2007) How a 'good war' in Afghanistan went bad. The New York Times, 12 August.
8. no. 6.
9. Ibid.
10. Johnson, T.H. (2007) On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The
11.  Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan. China and Eurasia

        Forum Quarterly 5(2)

12. Najibullah Lafraie, Resurgence of the Taliban insurgency in

        Afghanistan: How and why? Department of Politics,

        University of Otago, PO Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New

        Zealand.

13. Brahma Chellaney, Times of India, 02 Jan 2009.
14. Ibid.
15. www.crisisgroups.org
16. no. 12.
17. www.cfr.org (Council on Foreign Relations- Washington)
18. Barnett R Rubin, Still Ours to Lose: Afghanistan on the

            Brink, Council on Foreign Relations, September 21, 2006.

19. www.cfr.org (Council on Foreign Relations- Washington)
20. Andrew Mack, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The
21. Politics of Asymmetric Conflict in Klaus Knorr Ed. Power,

        Strategy and Security, Asian Books, New Delhi, p.126

22. Henry A. Kissinger, “The Vietnam Negotiations”, Foreign

        Affairs, XLVIII, January, 1996, p. 214 Afghanistan Study

        Group Report (Centre for the Study of the Presidency),

        Second Edition, Release date-30 Jan 2008.

23. Afghanistan Study Group Report (Centre for the Study of

        the Presidency), Second Edition, release date-30 Jan 2008.

24. Sky, E. (2007) Increasing ISAF's Impact on Stability in

       Afghanistan. Defense & Security Analysis 23(1)

       Afghanistan Study Group Report (Centre for the Study of

       the Presidency), Second Edition, release date-30 Jan 2008.

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