WAR ON TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN: US POLICY AND RESPONSES
-Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria*
There is nothing more difficult to take into hand, more perilous to conduct or more uncertain in its success than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things…
-Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (1532)

The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon changed the calculus by demonstrating how terrorists can use sanctuaries in the most remote and hitherto ignored regions of the world to mount devastating attacks against the United States and its friends and allies. In the post-9/11 world, national security experts are coming to the consensus that threats to U.S. security may arise from areas within states or at the boundaries between states that, for various reasons, are not controlled by a central authority. And so the US took the lead in undertaking the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan. As a result of the war on terrorism, a serious disruption of the functioning of the community or society in Afghanistan is evident causing widespread human, material, economic and perhaps environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own present resources and hence the role of the stake holders especially that of the United States becomes extremely important.

The sudden changes brought on by the conflict has exacerbated problems that people face daily, and could challenge Afghanistan’s national security by heightening conditions for conflict such as inequality, resource scarcity, social grievances, political tension, and distortions. The developmental failures have added to the vulnerabilities of the population and the political, economic, and social systems. Hence, these are serious concerns for Security which may be seen as lack of conflict, territorial claims, inequalities, defence of ideologies, racism and vulnerable human conditions. Thus, besides reducing Resource scarcity, Poverty/inequality, Political instability, Lack of development and Lack of human security the task of the US has to deal with the Militant Conflict and ensure the physical security of individuals in Afghanistan and reduce their vulnerable conditions.
*Associate Professor, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, Allahabad Central University, Allahabad-211002



INSIDE AFGHANISTAN

As one senior NATO official mentions, the Taliban and other forces now operate in a large swath of territory that includes Afghanistan’s western, southern, eastern, and parts of central Afghanistan. NATO and Afghan forces control at most 20 percent of southern Afghanistan. The rest is controlled by Taliban or a range of sub-state groups.1 Another recent National Intelligence Estimate from the United States argued: “Al-Qaeda is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland …We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.”2 One senior Afghan government official stated in October 2007 about the insurgency in Afghanistan that now engulfs roughly half the country “The answer is simple, “The people are losing faith in the government. Our security forces cannot protect local villages, and our institutions struggle to deliver basic services.”3

The resurgence of civil war in Afghanistan can be attributed to two fundamental causes. One is the failure of the United States, the Karzai government, and the international community as a whole to take advantage of the lull in that conflict that followed the collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001 to strengthen the capacity of the new Afghan government to project its authority and provide public services, including security, to the population beyond Kabul. The second cause is the fragmentation of the international coalition that the United States put together in late 2001 to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan. The situation can be gauged from the fact that Karzai is secure only inside his own compound, and doesn’t trust his own defence ministry troops to act as his bodyguards.4

In Afghanistan, all politics is local. The country's history is littered with empires that failed to understand this reality. The Taliban and its allies certainly understand the importance of local politics. They have successfully re-emerged by co-opting or threatening local villagers, and promising better governance and security than the current Afghan government. Afghans are frustrated by the lack of development over the past five years, and unhappy with widespread government corruption. This makes the Taliban's threat real and significant. The Taliban and its allies have a strong presence in local villages throughout such provinces as Kandahar and Helmand, and are preparing sustained operations. The message of the Taliban clearly has resonated with a growing number of locals in southern and eastern parts of the country. It is telling that the Taliban's primary target (to be influenced) is not U.S. or NATO forces, but local Afghans. This reflects the understanding that the local population represents the centre of gravity, as Mao Zedong famously wrote. Greg Grant in his analyses says “the U.S.-led coalition faces an emboldened and more effective Taliban today than it did six years ago, and that U.S. and NATO emphasis on Taliban body counts is meaningless because the Taliban have demonstrated they can raise and disband a fighting force at will.”5

As American and world attention focuses on Iraq, the military situation in Afghanistan over the past year has so deteriorated that the shaky American and NATO coalition risks losing the war against the Taliban.6 U.S. commanders say they have readily defeated the Taliban in every fight. But critics say the United States is losing the strategic battle because of its pursuit of a counter terror strategy that emphasizes killing and capturing Taliban, instead of a counterinsurgency strategy that places more emphasis on reconstruction. The United States intervened in Afghanistan to destroy Al -Qaeda and the Taliban, not to rebuild the country or spread democracy, and has not adjusted its strategy since, says James Dobbins, a former U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan and director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at RAND Corporation.7

Anthony H. Cordesman, a leading expert on military and security developments in Afghanistan, in an interview admits that despite some gains, the situation remains tenuous and says that “We have seen in Afghanistan more success for the Taliban in 2007 than we saw in 2006. If you look at intelligence maps of the area of Taliban influence in Afghanistan, it has increased by about four times in 2006. It increased arguably, according to UN maps, by somewhere between 50 [percent] and 70 percent in 2007.” He further adds that “NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] has decisively defeated the Taliban in virtually ever tactical encounter it has had in the last year. But what you can see if you map something different, which is the area under the Taliban under political and economic influence when NATO is not actively present, these are the areas where the influence has increased.”8

THE CHALLENGE

Apart from the building of political institutions, other major Security Council goals (read US) that remain unfulfilled are enhancing internal security; disarming militias; countering the narcotics trade; building an effective, independent judiciary system; expanding human rights; improving health and education; and building critical infrastructure such as roads.
The United States must place four interlocking objectives:
(1) Afghanistan must establish internal and external security to ensure economic reconstruction, political stability, and stem the rise in opium production;
(2) It must work to establish a stable, effective, and broadly representative central government;
(3) The economic development must bolster this new government and reduce dependence on donors; and
(4) It must help the people of Afghanistan meet their critical humanitarian needs while reconstruction proceeds.
The costs of this ambitious set of goals are substantial. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution estimates that between $15 billion and $50 billion is needed for the rebuilding of Afghanistan over a 10-year period and suggests that the United States provide at least 15 percent of the total aid to retain influence over “how the aid effort is administered and how the country is rebuilt.”9
Although, it cannot be said that the country has not moved forward in any way but there appears no end for the mess in which the US finds itself. Afghanistan held presidential elections in October 2004 and parliamentary elections in September 2005. President Hamid Karzai has retained relatively high levels of support. According to a December 2007 public opinion poll, for instance, 63 percent of Afghans rated the work of President Karzai positively.10
Indeed, the primary challenge in Afghanistan is one of governance. Governance includes the set of institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.11 Perhaps the most basic governance challenge in Afghanistan is security. A recent assessment from Afghanistan’s intelligence service, the National Directorate for Security, concluded that there are too few competent Afghan forces to provide security to the population in rural areas of the country.12 The result is that key villages have fallen into the hands of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. The villages are gradually emptied of pro-government political forces and individuals. These rural areas become sanctuaries for the Taliban, and the population is left with no choice but to become sympathizers of the insurgents.

Another major challenge is corruption. Afghans have become increasingly frustrated with national and local government officials who are viewed as corrupt and self-serving. This sentiment is just as palpable in rural areas of the country as it is in the cities. There are government officials at the district, provincial, and national levels involved in drug-trafficking, who are more interested in making money than in serving their populations. Indeed, rising levels in the cultivation, production, and trafficking of poppy have undermined governance. Afghanistan has also faced challenges from outside actors, which have undermined governance. The first is a limited NATO role. Its roots hearken back to the “light footprint” approach adopted by the United States and other international actors – including the United Nations – in 2001which continues even today. The peacekeepers numbers were particularly insufficient because a number of NATO countries refused to become involved in combat operations. This practice has been referred to as “national caveats,” In addition, political leaders were reluctant to deploy their forces into violent areas because of low domestic support for combat operations. In a German Marshall Foundation poll, for example, 75 percent of Germans, 70 percent of Italians, and 72 percent of Spanish did not support the deployment of their troops for combat operations in Afghanistan.13

Unfortunately, there are no short-term solutions to Afghanistan’s challenges. Research indicates that it takes an average of 14 years for governments to defeat insurgent groups. Many also end in a draw, with neither side winning. Insurgencies can also have long tails: approximately 25 percent of insurgencies won by the government and 11 percent won by insurgents lasted more than 20 years. If one starts counting in 2002, when the Taliban began conducting limited offensive operations, history suggests that it would take on average until 2016 to win. That is a long time for many NATO countries. But it is realistic. This does not mean, however, that the US or other NATO countries need to – or should – win the insurgency for Afghans. While outside actors often play an important role, victory is usually a function of the struggle between the local government and insurgents. First, outside forces are unlikely to remain for the duration of any counterinsurgency effort, at least as a major combatant force. Since indigenous forces eventually have to win the war on their own, they must develop the capacity to do so. If they don’t develop this capacity, indigenous forces are likely to lose the war once international assistance ends. Second, indigenous forces usually know the population and terrain better than external actors, and are better able to gather intelligence. Third, a lead outside role may be interpreted by the population as an occupation, eliciting nationalist reactions that impede success. Fourth, a lead indigenous role can provide a focus for national aspirations and show the population that they – and not foreign forces – control their destiny.


US POLICY AND ROLE
America's prior nation-building experiences suggest that external aid has a limited effect in the reconstruction of so-called failed states. Afghanistan provides a model for a broader policy framework wherein American intervention would be confined to eliminating national security threats rather than getting entangled in counterproductive nation-building exercises around the globe. The U.S. military forces currently operating in Afghanistan should concentrate on smashing the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants that are regrouping along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Once this goal is achieved, U.S. forces need not remain in the nation. Following the end of military operations, the focus could then shift to monitoring Afghanistan and its neighbours to ensure that forces that threaten the United States are not resurrected.

The current insurgency in Afghanistan does not arise from a profound disaffection among large elements of the Afghan population with their government. This insurgency has been raised in Pakistan, but individual’s resident in Pakistan, some of whom are refugees from Afghanistan, others who are native Pakistanis. For the tens of millions of Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of the current border, the distinction between Afghan and Pakistani is, indeed, of little import, as neither they, nor the government of Afghanistan, for that matter, recognize the current border between the two countries as legitimate.

In order to undertake the challenge, the old cold war mindset deserves a re look. There seems to be a view that a relentless attack against Islamic insurgents wherever they surface should be waged. The view is as seemingly logical as the Cold War belief in a worldwide communist conspiracy for global domination — and just as wrong. The belief is also harmful, for four major reasons. First, as in the Cold War, the belief in a global insurgency can lead the United States to make local commitments on the basis of vague overarching global principles. This commits America to send more troops, sustain greater military casualties, and spend more money than it possibly could in multiple conflicts at times and place of the insurgents' choosing. Second, a U.S.-led global counterinsurgency makes it more difficult for the United States to defeat insurgencies. Successful counterinsurgents fight as patriots in the service of their own country — not as United States clients. Third, equipping Americans with a mindset that places prominence on the global common features of insurgencies at the expense of fine-textured local features makes the U.S. military less effective in combating insurgencies. Fourth, belief in a global counterinsurgency leads to mismanagement of counterinsurgency campaigns because it undercuts the leadership of governments allied with the United States and of American military commanders battling an insurgency.

Hence, keeping these lessons in mind, a collective effort must be made to invigorate the global war on terror. In order to energize the global war on terror certain steps could be taken which may be enumerated as under:
 Updating the UN Charter and breaking the Definitional Impasse on
Terrorism
 Launch Operation Global Peace
 Transform the global war as a truly UN led war
 OIC, Russia and China be taken on board
 Declare 2009 and 2010 as Years to Combat Global Terror
 Centralized Control and Coordination HQ be set up for Regional Operations
 Disrupt financing of Terrorist Networks
 Ostracize Fence Sitters
 Wage a War of Ideas

CONCLUSIONS
The lesson for the United States and NATO is stark. They will win or lose Afghanistan in the rural villages and districts of the country, not in the capital city of Kabul. And if they are to win, they must begin by understanding the local nature of the insurgency.
As we are seeing today in Iraq and Afghanistan, America has been unable to defeat insurgencies with the sheer power of the U.S. military. Ultimately it will be the local conditions, population, unique features and personalities of each nation that will determine the outcome of the insurgencies against the U.S.-backed governments. The larger lesson is to retain the clarity of a "local" versus "global" perspective in dealing with the future insurgency challenge. Viewing the Taliban as nothing more than a highly radicalized vision of Islam, and viewing all Taliban as terrorists, misses the shared Pashtun tribal ethnicity of the insurgency and the family and clan ties that are stronger than any ties to the central government.

It should take effective steps which could contribute in its peacekeeping efforts. First the United States should intensify quite efforts to encourage both India and Pakistan to resolve their differences over Kashmir, that dispute being the root cause of radicalization in Pakistani society and governments use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Second, the assistance programs need to address the economic and social needs of the Pashtun populations on both sides of the border, not just in Afghanistan. There is only limited benefit in winning the hearts and minds of Pashtuns resident in Afghanistan if the larger number of Pashtuns living in Pakistan remain hostile and ungoverned. Third, there is a need to encourage both the Afghan and Pakistani governments to establish an agreed border regime and legitimize the current frontier. American efforts alone, no matter how intense and skilful, will not be sufficient to achieve any of these objectives. An effective strategy is badly needed to involve Afghanistan’s neighbours and regional powers in a renewed effort to end the war.
It should be clearly understood that if one’s only tool is the hammer, it would not serve the purpose every time. In the changing world, the US badly needs some new tools. Only then it will be able to face the challenge it has undertaken.
REFERENCES:
1. Seth G Jones, “The State of the Afghan Insurgency”, Testimony presented before the Canadian Senate National Security and Defence Committee on December 10, 2007, Rand Corporation, CA, 2007, p. 2
2. National Intelligence Council, The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2007), p. 5.
3. no.1, p. 4
4. Marc Kaufman, “U.S. Role Shifts As Afghanistan Founders,” Washington Post, April 14, 2003.
5. Greg Grant, “Govexec.com: Tribal War: Taliban 2.0,”Council on Foreign Relations, NY, March 1, 2007
6. Greg Grant, ggrant@govexec.com Government Executive March 1, 2007, p.1
7. Ibid, p.3
8. Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, in an Interview with Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for International and Strategic Studies, “Cordesman : Despite Gains, Future in Iraq, Afghanistan Remains ‘Uncertain”, Council on Foreign Relations, NY, January 14, 2008, p. 3
9. Subodh Atal, “At a Crossroads in Afghanistan Should the United States Be Engaged in Nation Building?,” CATO Institute’ Washington, D.C., Foreign Policy Briefings, No.81 September 24, 2003, p.3
10. ABC News / BBC / ARD, Afghanistan – Where Things Stand (Kabul: ABC News / BBC / ARD, December 2007), p. 16.
11. World Bank, Governance Matters 2006: Worldwide Governance Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), p. 2.
12. no.1, p. 5
13. German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo (Italy), Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2007 (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, 2007), p. 33.