Thursday, July 8, 2010

INDIA-homeland security KNEE-JERK RESPONSE

entre-state
synergy:
the bulwark

-Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria
We have ‘guided missiles’
but ‘misguided men’ ready
to become terrorists. We
have ‘United Nations’ but not ‘United
Notions’. We have witnessed a
combination of terror and technology
being funded by narcotics money as
a major source. Although carried out
by ‘non-State actors’, the adversary
State (Pakistan) works as promoter of
terrorism and has institutionalised it in
the wake of a weak response giving an
impression that India is a soft State - a
position which ought to change to fight
terrorism.
▌▌Most assaulted
Terrorism is not new to India – but
what is unique now is the evolved
characteristics and the enhanced
operational capabilities of the
terrorist outfits and their operatives.
Surprisingly, India is ranked second,
right behind Iraq in the number of
terrorist activities (excluding Jammu
and Kashmir) despite the fact it is not
a country in conflict. The ‘new breed’ of
terrorism in India is confident, bold in
actions and increasingly sophisticated
making it the greatest threat to India’s
security.
India has consistently been
highlighting the need for a unified
international response to trans-national
and trans-border terrorism which is
today affecting a number of countries
and challenging established societies
and governments. The links between
terrorist groups operating in India and
other countries are quite clear today
and the role that Pakistan has played in
allowing this scourge to spread has also
been amply documented.
▌▌Concerted action
India has sought to emphasise at
international fora that terrorism is a
global menace to which democracies
are particularly vulnerable. It has called
for concerted global action to counter
terrorism and to ensure the enactment
of measures such as sanctions against
States responsible for sponsoring
terrorist acts across international
borders. But, it has not borne any
noticeable fruitful results.
The challenge clearly is emanating
from across the border primarily
from our western neighbour Pakistan
which can at best be described as a
‘functional anarchy’ with weakening
or breakdown of systems. It has a
weak democracy and weak President
and Prime Minister. With a crumbled
economy and growing unemployment
along with madrasas turning pupils
into religious zealots, the predicament
can be well imagined.
It has a restless Army and Inter-
Services Intelligence (state within state)
inclined to maintain their prominence.
To top it all, it has an uncontrolled
militia (multiple jihadist groups).
Consequently, it has been a target of
self-entrapment due to various counter
productive policies being followed
which are reflective of the emotional
psyche of a theocratic State. The
affairs inside Pakistan are bound to
spillover in the region and have serious
consequences for India.
▌▌Terror chameleon
In the wake of the Mumbai
terror siege, the challenge today for
India’s security machinery is not
only tackling terror attacks but also
providing a tactical response to the
changing operational and ideological
undercurrents that terrorism in the
country is presently going through
which have to be understood.
a. ) For the first time ever, the (Islamic)
terrorism has a pan-India network of
operatives and logistics support. There
has been a display of amateurism by
some highly-placed leaders to brand
terrorism as an Islamic evil that has to
be fought and defeated, is to overlook
the reality that terrorism, like any
other criminal activity, has neither
religion nor race nor caste. Giving
new meanings and interpretations to
terrorism to suit the occasion will only
help in obfuscating the issues involved.
b. ) The trend towards larger and
sophisticated attacks - i.e. terrorists are
exploiting the increasingly abundant
communication infrastructure and
information flow for their collaboration,
creation of covert support networks,
financing, intelligence gathering,
logistics and operational execution.
c. ) The ideological underpinning is
undergoing a change, as reflected by
the operatives increasingly having a
local urban face, contrary to what used
to happen a few years back.
d. ) There has been a major shift in the
targeting patterns of the terror outfits as
is evident in the recent attacks wherein
posh business and commercial centres
have been attacked. Terrorists are
increasingly likely to target westerners
and businesses (as was seen in the
past), and employ new tactics such as
hostage-taking and random shootings
at peak hours in crowded places. The
excessive nature of the terror attacks is
in itself a big concern.
▌▌Policy implementation
This leads us to the question that
does the Government of India have a
comprehensive anti-terrorism policy?
If yes, then the salient points of that
policy need to be publicised which has
not been done. The man responsible
for counter-terrorism in India had
announced a sweeping overhaul of
the country’s internal security and
intelligence apparatus in the wake of
the Mumbai terrorist attacks. Home
Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram
outlined the revamp in Parliament.
He said a new national investigation
agency would be established, coastal
security forces bolstered and anti-terror
laws strengthened. Police would also
receive better training. But, the fruits
of his announcements still remain to be
effectively implemented.
▌▌Vacillating policies
So, any analyst in the absence
of evident change which inspires
confidence and gives a feeling of
security would conclude that there is a
virtual ‘no concrete policy’ declaration.
There is no clarity and detailing as to
who is responsible to monitor and
implement the policy on the ground
and at the time of crisis and what the
status of implementation is. Nothing
concrete has emerged, except boasting
through hollow statements which gives
rise to another notion that India is a
‘soft state’.
Terming India’s policy on terrorism
as a confused one, KPS Gill claimed
that there was no national policy
against terrorism in India. ‘‘We have
a mixed policy with a combination
of the state and the centre and in my
opinion there is not even a single state
that has a tough policy on terrorism,’’
he said. According to him, a stop and
go policy cannot withstand terrorism.
On scrutiny, the weaknesses /
shortcomings can be summarised
under the following heads:
• Lack of Integrated Investigating
Agency
• Lack of Federal Laws
• Delayed functioning of judiciary
• Police reforms being kept in cold
storage
• Ineffective and indifferent polity
• Divisive vote bank politics and
appeasement policies
• Poor strategic communications
and information management
▌▌ Ad hoc responses
Experts say the government’s
response to terrorist attacks have
been episodic; soon after an attack the
government appears to take shortterm
measures. “India lacks a coherent
strategic response to terrorism; there is
no doctrine (Business Week) and most of
our responses are ‘knee-jerk’. There is
a broad consensus that India’s counterterrorism
agencies have not responded
well.
Some Indian journalists called the
Mumbai bombings a failure of the
country’s intelligence community.
Stephen P. Cohen, a Senior Fellow
at the Brookings Institution, says
that within the ongoing debate over
the effectiveness of India’s counterterrorism
apparatus, “there’s general
agreement that the old institutions
can’t cope with the new pressures.”
Wilson John, a Senior Fellow with
the Observer Research Foundation in
New Delhi, writes in the ‘Terrorism
Monitor’ the problem is an intelligence
structure which has yet to emerge
from its “debilitating colonial legacy
and a complementary stranglehold of
bureaucracy.” John argues the state
police and intelligence units are mostly
structured as agencies to protect law
and order and spy on rivals rather than
act as investigative and intelligence
units. He says there is reluctance and
even refusal, to share information
among the intelligence and security
agencies.
▌▌Political mindset
Others counter that the intelligence
agencies are performing well, but
politicians too often shy away from
making tough security decisions for
fear of angering their constituents.
Jeevan Deol, a Lecturer in South Asian
Studies at the University of London,
says, “There may well be occasions
where elected politicians may not see
it in their interest to isolate insurgent
groups.”
He says their actions are nothing “too
unusual for an elected democracy”.
Some have criticised the government
(Asia Times) for letting politics stand in
the way of necessary security measures
and proper intelligence gathering.
India’s counter-terrorism measures
have often been the subject of appeals
by human rights organisations which
is a serious consideration for the
operating forces.
▌▌Obvious errors
On analyses of the past events, one
can point out the Intelligence and
systemic failure responsible for the state
of affairs which may be enumerated as
below:
• Lack of co-ordination by National
Security Advisor (NSA)
• One-upmanship of different
agencies
• Poor command and control
(different agencies controlling the sea)
• Poor standard operating
procedures
• Creation of power centres
• Gaps in surveillance / lack of
actionable intelligence
• Weak policing (training, focus,
equipment, weapons and political
abuse)
▌▌ Options
Theoretically, there are three options
before a State in tackling the vexed
problem:
• First, is to adopt a political course
that prevents alienation of any segment
of population so that it does not take
recourse to or supports unlawful
activities or terrorism.
• Second, is to take recourse to
defence and deterrence that prevents
attacks and cripples the capabilities of
potential terrorist groups.
• Third, is to destroy the terrorist
infrastructure, wherever it may exist,
inside the borders or across the borders.
These three options are debatable
though mandatory to carry out any
successful counter-insurgency exercise.
It is accepted that it is not going to
be so simplistic to put these options
into practice without following a
single-minded approach bereft of any
deviation which is not easy in a vibrant
democracy like India with the inherent
pulls and pressures. India is a complex
society to govern.
▌▌Joint operations
The central government and the
state governments have their own
jurisdictions on many matters and both
share the power to legislate on many
subjects which complicate the issue.
The politics of national security should
give way to political consensus for
developing new mechanisms to fight
terrorism. Any new mechanism should
keep in mind the shared principle of
governance, regardless of party in
power and a responsibility to work
together. There should be greater joint
efforts among state governments as
well as between the central and state
governments.
India’s democracy is challenged
by communalism, excessive caste
consciousness and separatism. But the
State’s response to these challenges
has not been adequate and on the
contrary the politicians have exploited
it to their advantage irrespective of the
consequences. India confronts another
dilemma of transforming an orthodox
society of an ancient civilisation into
a modern State, from an agrarian
economy to an industrialised, urban
system though a democratic process.
The process is bound to be slower than
most of its people wanted and a degree
of turbulence was inevitable in such a
colossal change with security problems
to be addressed simultaneously. But
then there cannot be two views that
we need a dedicated, enlightened and
decisive leadership and an efficient
agency to look into this gravest security
threat and counter it efficiently.
▌▌Road ahead
It is thus imperative for us to
understand that terrorism can be best
met: Firstly, by understanding and
eliminating the causes that create and
provide motivation for the terrorists,
which is primarily caused when
society and State are thought to be
unresponsive to a large section of
people of their genuine demands;
secondly, by limiting the politics of
terrorism by creating a democratic
ground where even extreme ideologies
are allowed to defend their views,
policies and action in open public space
and thirdly, by incrementally isolating
extremism within society by defeating
their exponents’ views through an
ideological and political battle within
a democratic framework of nation
building process.
The present situation demands more
complex and sensitive approach to
deal with terrorism, which finds its
justification in primordial loyalties and
ideologies, like religion which has a
wider social resonance. In fact, in the
last decade, both in India and abroad,
the theologians, institutions and
ordinary people in the Islamic world
have provided theological opposition
and campaigned against terrorism
more than people of any other religion.
It is time we prominently publicise the
stand taken in support of the principled
opposition of these Islamic groups to
terrorism. We will contribute most to
the fight against terror by creating a
tolerant, secular and democratic society
and defending it.
▌▌Prerequisites
It has been recommended by many
that as an immediate priority, terrorism
in India needs to be handled more as
a matter of internal security and not
be dominated by its trans-national
context alone, particularly given the
existing geo-political scenario in south
Asia. The need of the hour is the
development and implementation of
an evolved incident based response,
clear definition of responsibilities of the
numerous security forces / agencies,
easy mobilisation of emergency security
teams, better investigative capabilities
and coordinated and expedited
response to intelligence inputs.
Although, India’s security
infrastructure is suitably large to 
support the emerging demands, the
shortcomings have been primarily due
to the uncoordinated tactical response
and the absence of the necessary
skills to undertake an effective
operational management with suitable
preventive, reactive and corrective
measures to anticipate and act. Some
of these measures which need to be
implemented and some others which
are already underway could be:
• Undertaking police reforms
(Preventive)
• Strengthening India’s coasts
(Preventive)
• Defining detailed roles,
responsibilities and procedures to
identify, announce, control and
counter terror attacks (Reactive)
• Define do’s and don’ts for citizens
- affected and unaffected by the attack
and for the media (Reactive)
• Undertaking drills involving
counter terrorism security force,
citizens and media (Reactive)
• Formulating tougher anti-terror
laws on the lines of the US Patriot Law
(Reactive and Corrective)
• Regular review of the policy
(Corrective)

The need for establishing a new

Central Anti-Terrorism Commission

(CAT-COM), which should be under

the Prime Minister’s Office, has been

enunciated by many. But for fighting

terrorism to establish secure society ought

to become one of the top priorities of good governance.

▌▌Difficult assessment
Terrorists don’t kill in the hope
that their depredations will lead to
attainment of their political goals, they
kill to break the will of the government.
Correlation between the policy
initiatives taken by the government
and their real impact on terrorism is
also vague, diffused and a matter of
subjective interpretation. For example,
the efficacy of counter-terrorist laws,
structural changes in the security
apparatus, role of diplomatic initiatives,
political engagement are all difficult to
determine, at least in a short run. This
provides scope for political decisionmakers
to take positions on political
considerations as
there are no clear
policy rights and
wrongs in the battle
against terrorism.
Besides the
turbulence and
tension that is
incidental to
the process of
development our
country has been
constantly contending
with the problem
of ‘regime interest’
versus ‘national
interest’ which has
to be addressed and
national interest is
held supreme and
only then we will
be able to minimise
the problem of
terrorism and
counter it effectively.
Diplomacy will help
address the external dimensions of the
problem but India needs to clean up its
side of the street.
▌▌Vulnerability of society
No open society can completely
protect itself against all acts of terrorism.
Security resources are always finite and
the potential terrorist targets always
infinite. The terrorists will continue
to demonstrate tactical adaptability,
which will make it difficult to plan
security measures around past threats
or a few threat scenarios. But India’s
government surely can do a better job
of protecting its citizens by the use of
diplomacy, military and socio-political
options besides creating a favourable
ambience by clever manipulation of
international climate.
Another important issue that receives
less attention in the larger framework
of policies to fight terrorism is related to
creating secure and humane societies.
Our governments ought to continue
to work towards eradicating poverty,
reducing disparities of income and
wealth, eliminating corruption and
indeed formulating good governance
policies.
What must also be clearly understood
is that ultimately Indians can’t count
on their government alone. They need
to also reserve the right and the means
to defend themselves. The role of civil
society and religious communities in
the fight against terror should not be
underestimated. Finally, one has to resort
back to spiritual solace and traditional,
cultural, moral / ethical values when we
are facing a crisis of insaniyat in the form
of terrorism.
The writer is Associate Professor in the
Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies,
Allahabad Central University, Allahabad.
He has done his doctorate (D.Phil.) on Indo-
US Relations (1971-85) from the University
of Allahabad. He has authored three books
and a monograph on ‘National Security’.

Monday, October 12, 2009

THE GEO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE AMERICAN STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

THE GEO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE AMERICAN STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

-Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria*

The US policy has always exhibited a deep sense of insecurity and quest for materialistic gains along with its self acquired role of acting as an universal policeman - the need for which is sometimes real but most of the time imaginary, bordering on ‘paranoia.’ Moreover, the American engine has always needed an extraneous threat to set it in motion. Previously, it was the communist threat. Now it is the threat posed by the ‘ungoverned states’. The sources of concern today are the states with large tracts of ungoverned territories like Afghanistan which offer ample opportunities to further its interests under the garb of international obligations. The situation in Afghanistan offers fertile ground for the US and the September 11, 2001 incident provided it with the reason to decipher its ambition. Although, Afghanistan has gone from one of Washington’s greatest foreign policy triumphs to one of its most profound failures. During the Cold War, U.S. support to the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance resulted in a debacle for Moscow, humiliating the vaunted Red Army and discrediting the Soviets throughout the Muslim world. After the Soviets withdrew, however, Afghanistan has proved to be a disaster for U.S. policy, especially in its second endeavour after September 11, 2001.

 

The geo-political dynamics of this country with a strategic location has led the policy makers in Washington to show ample interest and be involved in its affairs like it has been in the cold war period. The American interest in Afghanistan post Soviet invasion in 1979 was guided initially by a purely short term, tactical and emotive agenda to seek ‘historical revenge’ for Vietnam. However, once the Soviets withdrew, their interest in Central Asia suddenly revived and peaked due to the quest for the estimated 70 billion tons of oil reserves of Central Asia. The American geo-political drive also appears to be motivated by the containment/engagement of China, Iran and extracting Central Asian oil and gas for the world market, in addition to putting the NATO right there at the door-step of Russia. With 9/11 attack, it realized to its chagrin & shock that the rabidly fundamentalist Al-Qaeda & Taliban, their own creation, struck them with a vicious force that shook them beyond their realms of imagination. It is now engaged in waging a war on terrorism with the help of an International force (ISAF), mainly NATO and has pledged a vast sum for the reconstruction work in Afghanistan.

 

INTRODUCTION

 

Afghanistan can be characterized geographically as a mountainous desert interspersed with isolated fertile valleys, river basins and oases. It extends eastward from the Iranian plateau and incorporates the foothills of the Himalayan ranges, which rise to a height of 7470 meters in the finger of land that divides Tajikistan from Pakistan and touches on Western China. To the North of this range, known as the Hindu Kush, begin the plains that cross the Afghan frontier at the Amu Darya river and stretch for thousands of miles across Central Asia and the Russian steppes to the Arctic. To the South of the Hindu Kush is a bleak and windswept desert that passes through Pakistan to the Indian Ocean. More importantly, Afghanistan has an important geo-strategic location, connecting Middle East, Central and South Asia.

 

It provides a land bridge to Central Asia’s vast oil and natural gas deposits. It is completely landlocked and only 30,000 sq km out of 6, 47,500 sq km is irrigated land. 31.75% people are literate & unemployment ranges from 40-60%. It stands at 174th rank in terms of Human Resource Development Index in the world. In recent estimates by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 52% of the nation's GDP, amounting to $2.7 billion annually, is generated by the drug trade. Some 3.3 million Afghans are involved in producing opium (90% of world cultivation). It has a railway network of only 24.6 km and a road network of 21,000 km most of which has been reconstructed recently. Out of 45 airports only 10 have paved runways. It is clearly one of the more under-developed countries and the only positive indicator is the growing telephone network which stood at 15,000 fixed line telephones in 2001 has now grown to 4.5 million including the cellular network due to the reconstruction effort.

 

THE GEO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS

 

We all are aware of the role of the regional actors in Afghanistan and the resulting ‘muddle’ since the Soviet Invasion, the consequent civil war, the Bonn Agreement and  the ‘Afghanistan Compact’.  Some important issues that emerge which are worth taking note are:-

 

(a)        Afghanistan's strategic location at the "fault line", of four civilizations1 - Islamic, Russian Orthodox, Chinese and Hindu – which has arguably been a significant factor for the region’s instability.

 

(b)        Afghanistan's internal political fragility and external vulnerability continues to exist due to the country's fragmented social structure and rule of warlords and their linkage to regional actors.

 

(c)        The existence of terrorist groups in Pakistan, many of them backed by elements of the country's military and fundamentalist Islamic groups like the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-­Islam which remain as the forces of instability both in Pakistan and   Afghanistan - even in the face of Pakistan's apparent crackdown2.

 

(d)        Central Asia's huge oil and gas deposits continue to provide incentives to the regional actors including Russia who strive for their say in the region's geo-politics. That remains as an impediment in the region's political development vis-à-vis the US military presence.

 

(e)        Afghanistan's ethnic linkages and geo-political ‘susceptibility’ with neighbouring countries - Pakistan, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran – which continue to haunt the country despite American military presence and that in turn will probably prolong the United States' presence.3

 

A retrospective analysis of Washington's policy towards the pre - 9/11 Afghanistan shows that the United States was ready to accept the fundamentalist regime of Taliban to further its geo-political ambition (oil and natural resources as probable incentives) in the region. The geo-strategic argument was that since the Taliban was pro-Pakistani, and at the same time anti-Russian and anti-Iranian, the United States ought to accept it. As per this argument, it was not an American affair to ascertain how the Taliban treats its own people, or to cater to "a stable Afghanistan with an aesthetically challenged government than a convulsed Afghanistan that offers a playground for Iranian and Russian devilments.” Nevertheless, the US hoped that after long years of turmoil, the Taliban would unite the country. A Sunni-dominated government in Kabul would serve as a bulwark against the influence of Iran in the region. There are also reports that the US is using Pakistani guerilla groups such as Jundullah to launch attacks on military and civilian bases in Iran4.

 

The containment of Iran had become an American strategy in the region, especially, after the Teheran government declared its readiness to extend port facilities to the newly independent Central Asian Republics. American interests in Afghanistan also increased when it became clear that the Rabbani government in Kabul had been drawn closer to Teheran, after the killing of Iran-backed Shia leader Abdul Ali Mazari by the Taliban in early 1995. What was more alarming for the Americans and the Pakistani intelligence agencies was the Iranian diplomatic success in bringing together of the erstwhile enemies of the Afghan war, Rabbani and Hekmatyar in an agreement in June 1996.

 

Afghanistan, being a transport-junction and land-approach between the Land-locked countries of Central Asia and the littoral states of the Indian Ocean, will remain strategically important4. Therefore, the competition over control of trade and pipeline routes from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea (Indian Ocean) transformed relations between Iran and Pakistan, and Teheran's initiative in this respect was openly supported by Russia and India. Taliban's ability to provide security for trade, and the projected pipelines was considered strategically advantageous to both Islamabad and Washington. Significantly, around this time, in the spring of 1996, a partnership between the American company UNOCAL and the Saudi Company DELTA had concluded plans for a multimillion-dollar ($2 billion) oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to Pakistani Baluchistan via Herat and Kandahar. Pakistan with the American backing (as an American company got involved) and Saudi Arabia considered the deal very lucrative since it was not just the trade route, but potential oil and gas pipelines were at stake. It was visualized that the, Taliban’s most important function was to provide "security for roads, and potentially, oil and gas pipelines that would link the states of Central Asia to the international market through Pakistan rather than through Iran.”5

 

It may be noted that the US was appeasing the Taliban at a time when the fundamentalist militia was training the Kashmiri, Uzbek, Tajik and Uighur radicals; thus spurring the growth of destabilizing fundamentalist movements throughout the region. But the hand-in-glove relationship could not last long as the real colours of Taliban came out soon. After the bombing of the American embassies in Dar-e-Salaam in Tanzania and Nairobi in Kenya in1998 by Al Qaeda, however, Washington had to review its Afghanistan policy, while continuing its regional drive on a broad strategic setup.

 

 

 

U.S. STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

 

The situation inside Afghanistan appears far from being rosy due to the current strategy being followed by the United States and its NATO partners which does not inspire confidence that Afghanistan will soon do better. President Hamid Karzai or his successor will need more help from the international community to have a decent chance of avoiding future instability in his country and gradually improving the lives of Afghans. Apart from this, Pakistan (a functional anarchy) is in the grip of one of its worst political crisis in recent years. The key components of the American perspective may be analysed as under:

 

The Light Foot print Policy                                                   

 

Lakhdar Brahimi, the first post-9/11 UN Special Representative for Afghanistan and the main architect of the Bonn Conference is the man behind the ‘Light Footprint’ policy. Bob Woodward reports in Bush at War that when the CIA analysts discussed the US options in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 'the general rule was to study what the Soviets had done and do the opposite'. As the Soviets had committed a large number of troops, it was decided to avoid doing that and instead rely on a small number of Special Forces, aerial bombardments and the anti-Taliban Afghan militias6.

Thus, the initial 'light footprint' policy was as much owing to this fear of repeating the Soviet mistakes as to the subsequent need of personnel and equipments for the war in Iraq. Although the number of American and Allied Forces gradually increased from a few hundred in the late 2001 to a few thousand in 2002, to about 10 000 in 2003 and to over 20 000 in October 2004 (during the Presidential election in Afghanistan); it was never sufficient to root out remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. There is little doubt that the lack of dependable security forces around the country gave rise to 'war lord-ism' and problems of law and order that contributed to the resurgence of the Taliban. The treatment of the captured Taliban by the Northern Alliance, especially by General Dostum forces, added another incentive for many people to join the Taliban. Taliban prisoners of war (POWs) were treated very inhumanely7, and it is alleged that thousands of them died while being transported in overcrowded containers from Kunduz to Dostum's headquarters in Sheberghan. The low-ranking Taliban, who did not attract much attention, failed to find meaningful jobs or means of livelihood either in Afghanistan or in the refugee camps. Thus, when the Taliban leadership reorganized itself and started recruitment, they found a fertile ground among the former members of the movement.

The trigger happy ISAF and the American troops while carrying out aerial bombardments ended up killing hundreds of civilians8, thus alienating themselves from the local populace. Lack of understanding of the local culture and sensibilities coupled with human rights abuse and torture of the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay fuelled sympathy for the rising Talibans9. Further the external forces and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are operating without consulting or respecting the sentiments of the Kabul Government.

If we add to this the weaknesses of Karzai viz, his own personality, factionalism within the government, questionable appointments, questionable legitimacy, rampant corruption, slow progress in reconstruction and human development, slow progress in creating an army and police force, narcotic drug problem and negative impacts of the free market economic policy have created an unacceptable situation in Afghanistan10. The policy of the American troops to negotiate with the local warlords while keeping the Kabul Government in dark has boosted the growth of ‘war-lordism’ once again and has also undermined the authority of the Karzai Government11. The situation has improved in Afghan’s capital-Kabul. But most rural parts of the country, where majority of Afghans live, remains beyond Mr. Karzai's control.

The Surge & Negotiate Policy

The "surge first, then negotiate" plan of Barrack Obama12  is to build up security in Afghan cities with new US troop arrivals before initiating talks with the Taliban. For the talks to be successful, the US intends to squeeze the Taliban first, including by taking another page from its Iraq experiment and setting up lightly trained local militias in every provincial district. The crux of the policy is to bring down violence by cutting deals to keep Taliban intact as a fighting force, with active ties with the Pakistani military. The move ignores the danger that such militias could terrorize local populations. If a resurgent Taliban is now on the offensive, with 2008 proving to be the deadliest year for US forces, it is primarily because of two reasons: The sustenance the Taliban still draws from Pakistan; and a growing Pashtun backlash against foreign intervention. A US surge will not intimidate local Taliban commanders and tribal chieftains to negotiate peace deals, especially when some countries with forces in Afghanistan are exhibiting war fatigue and a desire to pull out troops. Indeed, it is naive to expect an Iraq-style surge-and-bribe experiment to work in Afghanistan, whose mountainous terrain, myriad tribes, patterns of shifting tribal and ethnic loyalties, special status as the global hub of poppy trade and a history of internecine civil conflict set it apart from any other Muslim country.

In such a land with a long tradition of humbling foreign armies, pay-offs won't buy peace. Yet, the US champions a 21st-century version of a divide-and-conquer imperial strategy. If there is any certainty, it is that the US plan will help the already-entrenched Taliban sharpen its claws. However, to help justify "surge and bribe"13, a distinction is being drawn between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to portray the former as evil and the latter as a different force with whom a compromise ought to be pursued. The blunt fact is that Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani military-reared organizations like the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad now constitute a difficult-to-separate mix of jihad-spouting soul mates with safe havens in Pakistan. A deal with any one such group will only strengthen the global-jihad syndicate, plus the Pakistani military.

"Surge and bribe" is a short-sighted approach intent on repeating the very mistakes of American policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past three decades that have come to haunt US security and that of the rest of the free world. If America is to reclaim the global fight against terror, it will need to face up to the lessons from its past policies that gave rise to Franken steins like Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar and to "the state within the Pakistani state", the directorate of ISI, made powerful in the 1980s as a conduit of covert US aid for anti-Soviet Afghan guerrillas.

The primary lesson is to keep the focus on long-term interests and not be carried away by political expediency. Yet again, Washington is itching to give primacy to near-term considerations. Even if “in the best-case scenario” the Obama administration managed to bring down violence in Afghanistan by cutting deals that would keep the Taliban intact as a fighting force, with active ties to the Pakistani military. Such a tactical gain would exact serious costs on regional and international security14. In seeking such short-term success, the Obama team is falling prey to a long-standing US policy weakness: The pursuit of narrow objectives without much regard for the security of friends15.

 

At the same time, Afghanistan's neighbours have apprehensions on what they call the US grand design. They perceive that the US is now well entrenched with all its military might in the entire region and that it is not going to go back any time soon. And that the American geo-political drive is motivated by the containment of China, Iran and extracting Central Asian oil and gas to the world market, in addition to putting the NATO right there in the door-step of Russia16. As per this argument, American strategists believe that it would be convenient for them to deal with an unruly China and Iran while based in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Washington can have a close watch on the developments of the communist China and the unruly Iran, and the position would give access to more strategic mileage to the US foreign policy interests in the geo-politics of the region. Secondly, as stated above, through its military presence and economic and political support in the Central Asian Republics, Washington hopes to get access to the regions tremendous untapped reserves of oil.

ROLE OF REGIONAL POWERS

These strategic and geo-political ambitions of the United States have led to considerable resentment among the countries surrounding the region. Russian, Chinese, and Iranian unhappiness is particularly visible in this context. In order to keep the Americans away from their "dirty games" in the region17, these countries will continue to support the ethnic and tribal groups through whom they consider to promote their own geo-strategic interests. For instance, Chinese will continue to be perturbed by expanding US presence on its southwestern frontiers and support the anti-US forces; Russians to Tajiks and Uzbeks; and Iranians to their Shia minority ethnic group in the northwestern part of the country. Because these countries perceive that through its military presence in the region, the United States is unduly interfering in their "sphere of influence."

In this sense, the overarching American geo- political objective in the region will be kept off balance by the regional powers, and that will continue to keep Afghanistan fragile and fragmented. In the process, America might get bogged down militarily in this landlocked country that has a long history of fighting against the foreigners. Despite some high-handedness on terrorism and religious extremism, the regional actors complain that the US was not responding fully to the terrorist threat because it was not affecting the US interests directly. Leaders of Afghanistan's neighbours have pointed fingers at the US for its "selective approach" and "double standards."18 They view that while the enduring American military presence in Afghanistan and the region is not going to eliminate the specter of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, the menace provided a good pretext to the US entrenching itself in the region.

U.S. ANTI-INSURGENCY POLICY

 

The United States does not still have an Anti-insurgency policy in place primarily because like any other traditional State Army, it was meant to win Wars and not to fight Insurgency in the first place. But then a pertinent question arises that perhaps in its exuberance to react instantly, was the U.S. notion of dealing with insurgency flawed?

 

Let us examine the implications of an Insurgency operation where the U.S. Army is involved. In order to undertake the challenge, the old cold war mindset deserves a re-look.  There seems to be a view that a relentless attack against Islamic insurgents wherever they surface should be waged. The view is as seemingly logical as the Cold War belief in a worldwide communist conspiracy for global domination — and just as wrong. The belief is also harmful, for four major reasons. First, as in the Cold War, the belief in a global insurgency can lead the United States to make local commitments on the basis of vague overarching global principles. This commits America to send more troops, sustain greater military casualties, and spend more money than it possibly could in multiple conflicts at times and place of the insurgents' choosing. Second, a U.S.-led global counterinsurgency makes it more difficult for the United States to defeat insurgencies. Successful counterinsurgents fight as patriots in the service of their own country — not as United States clients. Third, equipping the Americans with a mindset that places prominence on the global common features of insurgencies at the expense of fine-textured local features makes the U.S. military less effective in combating insurgencies. Fourth, belief in a global counterinsurgency leads to mismanagement of counterinsurgency campaigns because it undercuts the leadership of governments allied with the United States and of American military commanders battling an insurgency. So, the larger lesson is to retain the clarity of a "local" versus "global" perspective and to selectively apply the lessons of previous successful campaigns in similar asymmetric conflicts.

Here, it would be interesting to analyze the politics of asymmetric conflicts and to figure out on the basis of the pre-theoretical perspective of Andrew Mack as to Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars? 19

The key facets of his thesis are:

      That Conventional wisdom that military superiority prevails in this war has been destroyed as the constraints on mobilization are political, not material. In none of the conflicts noted was more than a fraction of the total potential military resources of the external power in fact mobilized.

      The theatre of war extends beyond to encompass the polity and social institutions of the external power-full mobilization not possible as it also increases domestic costs.

      Direct costs become of strategic importance when translated into indirect costs - psychological and political as the aim of the insurgents is not the destruction of the military capability of their opponents as an end in itself.

      Dissent permitted in ‘open societies’ is an obstacle. The totalitarian societies are not troubled by the domestic constraints which U.S. faced on Vietnam.

      The progressively greater human, economic and political costs give rise to “war weariness”. The last years of the Vietnam conflict were marked by troop mutinies, widespread drug addiction, high levels of desertion, and even the murders of over-zealous officers’ intent on sending their men on dangerous patrols. 

It can be appreciated that the postulates propounded by Mack are valid and applicable in all prolonged asymmetric conflicts including the ongoing one in Afghanistan. Mack concludes with a lesson for the Governments (of U.S. and NATO countries in this case) which have committed themselves for such conflicts that they should realize that, over time, the costs of the conflict will inevitably generate widespread opposition at home. The causes of such a dissent lie in the structure of conflict itself – in the type of conflict being pursued and in the asymmetries which form its distinctive character.   Henry Kissinger has correctly observed on the War in Vietnam that “We lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerilla warfare that the guerilla wins if he does not lose & Conventional Army loses if it does not win”.20 It seems that the lessons should once again be remembered if the U.S. and NATO extend their campaign in Afghanistan. Today, when the United States is being asked to increase its level of commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan as a means of stabilizing the country, even as American troops battle the resurgent Islamic extremists who operate along the Afghan-Pakistan border, the key question especially in the wake of World economic recession is no longer whether to withdraw but rather when and how.  

THE ROAD AHEAD

Barrack Obama after assuming office had made a pleasing statement to the ears of Indian strategists that all aid to Pakistan will be linked to its performance in aiding and cooperating in the war against terror. Joe Biden, the Vice-President of USA had made a trip to Afghanistan just before the Presidential Inauguration and has also declared that it won’t hesitate to hit specific targets in Pakistan especially in the safe havens in Dir, Swat valley and the region of FATA should there be hard intelligence available. This had raised the hackles of the Pakistani establishment and they tried their level best to make America rethink and were finally successful in extracting aid without strings - a dangerous development which has the potential to destabilize the region. Hence, ‘Mission AFPAK’ will need all the diplomatic, military and economic might of America & all the regional players to succeed. Does America follow the Zero Sum Game or  Washington re-hyphenates the relationship in such a way that Pakistan gets a ‘Soft Landing’ and simultaneously engages New Delhi at a much higher level than before befitting an emerging Superpower remains to be seen.

Richard Holbrooke’s feedback and recommendations should help President Obama unfold his terms of engagement in future. Also there appears to be shift in America’s policy towards Iran and it should be a positive change that must be welcomed by all the regional players. It is imperative that US deals with Pakistan with an iron hand if it has to achieve success in the strife torn region. By naming a separate envoy for Pakistan & Afghanistan Mr. Richard  Holbrooke, without apparently linking the Kashmir issue as of now, Obama seems to follow a policy that may help its new strategic partner viz. India follow its own game strategy  in the region.

The January 2006 London conference, attended by more than sixty countries and international agencies produced a document called "Afghanistan Compact." The document predicated on every aspect of Afghanistan's social and economic development. Some of the suggestions given by the Afghan Study Group operating under the aegis of The Centre for the Study of the Presidency21 released in Jan 2008 also outlined the critical issues to be addressed by the US and its NATO partners which are related to International coordination, security, governance and the rule of law, counter-narcotics, economic development and reconstruction, and Afghanistan and its neighbours.

But, on the country's security challenges, Pakistan was not even named in connection with the growing insurgency. Instead, the Compact called for "full respect of Afghanistan's sovereignty, and strengthening dialogue and cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbours." The prime worry in Afghanistan is extremism of the kind which is continuing for a long time and these forces usually feed on political instability which to a large extent can be attributed to forces in Pakistan.

With this background, some issues and recommendations can be outlined which should be taken into account for Stabilizing Afghanistan by adoption of viable, practical & workable options: taking lessons from past counter-insurgency operations which may be enumerated as under:

      Indigenous forces eventually have to win the war on their own, they must be developed with the capacity to do so

      Concentrate on the main aim of neutralising Al- Qaeda and Taliban- countering Sanctuary in Pakistan

      Increase funds for rebuilding Infrastructure - ‘Reconstruction light’

       Restrained use of force in Civilian areas-not “Clear by Fire” tactics

      Understand the Local culture- family, clan, and tribal ties with concepts such as revenge and honour with less attachment and respect for the centralized state government

      Establish a regional approach to Afghanistan with the aid of UN and neighbouring countries: encourage Pak-Afghan Border to be settled

CONCLUSION

 

Bringing about a normal situation in this war-ravaged country will depend on how the United States acts in the coming days. The present trend does not look conducive to permanent peace in the country. The American peace efforts so far appear fragile, and the country is passing through a thin edge of instability as it is still being haunted by so many divisive and centrifugal forces. Afghanistan remains critical to the future of its neighbours, as instability in this land-locked country has the potential to destabilize the whole region. A potent combination of drugs, weapons, and militants traverse Afghanistan and cross into its neighbours and beyond, and hence, the seeds of instability remain intact22. The Bonn process, reconstruction of the country and its national security are not intrinsic to Afghan situation alone. It is in fact, heavily loaded with regional geopolitics. And within this geo-political entanglement, the regional actors look at the US presence with suspicion. As stated above, many believe that the geo-political factors such as Central Asia/Caspian energy resources; China's Xingjian, Iran, etc are the reasons for US interest in Afghanistan. And, if that is the case, and the United States remains bogged down in a growing insurgency in the country, and if the US missiles take more innocent lives, Washington's strategy could well backfire23.

This is the Centre of Gravity of the problem and unless a suitable End Game is not played out, the desired End state where the regional aspirations are fulfilled satisfactorily, may remain elusive. The Bonn process, reconstruction of the country under Afghan Compact and its national security are not intrinsic to Afghan situation alone. It is in fact, heavily loaded with regional geopolitics. And within this geo-political entanglement, the regional and non regional actors especially the US have to play their part decisively, proactively and positively.

We must have optimism for Afghanistan- Afghans want Security and Hope which they deserve after about 30 years of near-constant war but realism says it will take time.

REFERENCES

 

  1. Huntington Samuel P, The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of the World Order, Viking Penguin Books India, 1996.
  2. Giustozzi, A. (2008) Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. New York: Columbia University Press
  3. Ibid.
  4. Barnett R Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995.
  5. Barnett R Rubin, Still Ours to Lose: Afghanistan on the Brink, Council on Foreign Relations, September 21, 2006.
  6. Najibullah Lafraie, Resurgence of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: How and why? Department of Politics, University of Otago, PO Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New Zealand.
  7. Rohde, D. and Sanger, D.E. (2007) How a 'good war' in Afghanistan went bad. The New York Times, 12 August.
  8. no. 6.
  9. Ibid.
  10. Johnson, T.H. (2007) On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The
  11.  Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan. China and Eurasia

        Forum Quarterly 5(2)

  1. Najibullah Lafraie, Resurgence of the Taliban insurgency in

        Afghanistan: How and why? Department of Politics,

        University of Otago, PO Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New

        Zealand.

  1. Brahma Chellaney, Times of India, 02 Jan 2009.
  2. Ibid.
  3. www.crisisgroups.org
  4. no. 12.
  5. www.cfr.org (Council on Foreign Relations- Washington)
  6. Barnett R Rubin, Still Ours to Lose: Afghanistan on the

            Brink, Council on Foreign Relations, September 21, 2006.

  1. www.cfr.org (Council on Foreign Relations- Washington)
  2. Andrew Mack, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The
  3. Politics of Asymmetric Conflict in Klaus Knorr Ed. Power,

        Strategy and Security, Asian Books, New Delhi, p.126

  1. Henry A. Kissinger, “The Vietnam Negotiations”, Foreign

        Affairs, XLVIII, January, 1996, p. 214 Afghanistan Study

        Group Report (Centre for the Study of the Presidency),

        Second Edition, Release date-30 Jan 2008.

  1. Afghanistan Study Group Report (Centre for the Study of

        the Presidency), Second Edition, release date-30 Jan 2008.

  1. Sky, E. (2007) Increasing ISAF's Impact on Stability in

       Afghanistan. Defense & Security Analysis 23(1)

       Afghanistan Study Group Report (Centre for the Study of

       the Presidency), Second Edition, release date-30 Jan 2008.

___________________

Saturday, July 25, 2009

WAR ON TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN: US POLICY AND RESPONSES
-Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria*
There is nothing more difficult to take into hand, more perilous to conduct or more uncertain in its success than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things…
-Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (1532)

The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon changed the calculus by demonstrating how terrorists can use sanctuaries in the most remote and hitherto ignored regions of the world to mount devastating attacks against the United States and its friends and allies. In the post-9/11 world, national security experts are coming to the consensus that threats to U.S. security may arise from areas within states or at the boundaries between states that, for various reasons, are not controlled by a central authority. And so the US took the lead in undertaking the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan. As a result of the war on terrorism, a serious disruption of the functioning of the community or society in Afghanistan is evident causing widespread human, material, economic and perhaps environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own present resources and hence the role of the stake holders especially that of the United States becomes extremely important.

The sudden changes brought on by the conflict has exacerbated problems that people face daily, and could challenge Afghanistan’s national security by heightening conditions for conflict such as inequality, resource scarcity, social grievances, political tension, and distortions. The developmental failures have added to the vulnerabilities of the population and the political, economic, and social systems. Hence, these are serious concerns for Security which may be seen as lack of conflict, territorial claims, inequalities, defence of ideologies, racism and vulnerable human conditions. Thus, besides reducing Resource scarcity, Poverty/inequality, Political instability, Lack of development and Lack of human security the task of the US has to deal with the Militant Conflict and ensure the physical security of individuals in Afghanistan and reduce their vulnerable conditions.
*Associate Professor, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, Allahabad Central University, Allahabad-211002



INSIDE AFGHANISTAN

As one senior NATO official mentions, the Taliban and other forces now operate in a large swath of territory that includes Afghanistan’s western, southern, eastern, and parts of central Afghanistan. NATO and Afghan forces control at most 20 percent of southern Afghanistan. The rest is controlled by Taliban or a range of sub-state groups.1 Another recent National Intelligence Estimate from the United States argued: “Al-Qaeda is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland …We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.”2 One senior Afghan government official stated in October 2007 about the insurgency in Afghanistan that now engulfs roughly half the country “The answer is simple, “The people are losing faith in the government. Our security forces cannot protect local villages, and our institutions struggle to deliver basic services.”3

The resurgence of civil war in Afghanistan can be attributed to two fundamental causes. One is the failure of the United States, the Karzai government, and the international community as a whole to take advantage of the lull in that conflict that followed the collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001 to strengthen the capacity of the new Afghan government to project its authority and provide public services, including security, to the population beyond Kabul. The second cause is the fragmentation of the international coalition that the United States put together in late 2001 to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan. The situation can be gauged from the fact that Karzai is secure only inside his own compound, and doesn’t trust his own defence ministry troops to act as his bodyguards.4

In Afghanistan, all politics is local. The country's history is littered with empires that failed to understand this reality. The Taliban and its allies certainly understand the importance of local politics. They have successfully re-emerged by co-opting or threatening local villagers, and promising better governance and security than the current Afghan government. Afghans are frustrated by the lack of development over the past five years, and unhappy with widespread government corruption. This makes the Taliban's threat real and significant. The Taliban and its allies have a strong presence in local villages throughout such provinces as Kandahar and Helmand, and are preparing sustained operations. The message of the Taliban clearly has resonated with a growing number of locals in southern and eastern parts of the country. It is telling that the Taliban's primary target (to be influenced) is not U.S. or NATO forces, but local Afghans. This reflects the understanding that the local population represents the centre of gravity, as Mao Zedong famously wrote. Greg Grant in his analyses says “the U.S.-led coalition faces an emboldened and more effective Taliban today than it did six years ago, and that U.S. and NATO emphasis on Taliban body counts is meaningless because the Taliban have demonstrated they can raise and disband a fighting force at will.”5

As American and world attention focuses on Iraq, the military situation in Afghanistan over the past year has so deteriorated that the shaky American and NATO coalition risks losing the war against the Taliban.6 U.S. commanders say they have readily defeated the Taliban in every fight. But critics say the United States is losing the strategic battle because of its pursuit of a counter terror strategy that emphasizes killing and capturing Taliban, instead of a counterinsurgency strategy that places more emphasis on reconstruction. The United States intervened in Afghanistan to destroy Al -Qaeda and the Taliban, not to rebuild the country or spread democracy, and has not adjusted its strategy since, says James Dobbins, a former U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan and director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at RAND Corporation.7

Anthony H. Cordesman, a leading expert on military and security developments in Afghanistan, in an interview admits that despite some gains, the situation remains tenuous and says that “We have seen in Afghanistan more success for the Taliban in 2007 than we saw in 2006. If you look at intelligence maps of the area of Taliban influence in Afghanistan, it has increased by about four times in 2006. It increased arguably, according to UN maps, by somewhere between 50 [percent] and 70 percent in 2007.” He further adds that “NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] has decisively defeated the Taliban in virtually ever tactical encounter it has had in the last year. But what you can see if you map something different, which is the area under the Taliban under political and economic influence when NATO is not actively present, these are the areas where the influence has increased.”8

THE CHALLENGE

Apart from the building of political institutions, other major Security Council goals (read US) that remain unfulfilled are enhancing internal security; disarming militias; countering the narcotics trade; building an effective, independent judiciary system; expanding human rights; improving health and education; and building critical infrastructure such as roads.
The United States must place four interlocking objectives:
(1) Afghanistan must establish internal and external security to ensure economic reconstruction, political stability, and stem the rise in opium production;
(2) It must work to establish a stable, effective, and broadly representative central government;
(3) The economic development must bolster this new government and reduce dependence on donors; and
(4) It must help the people of Afghanistan meet their critical humanitarian needs while reconstruction proceeds.
The costs of this ambitious set of goals are substantial. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution estimates that between $15 billion and $50 billion is needed for the rebuilding of Afghanistan over a 10-year period and suggests that the United States provide at least 15 percent of the total aid to retain influence over “how the aid effort is administered and how the country is rebuilt.”9
Although, it cannot be said that the country has not moved forward in any way but there appears no end for the mess in which the US finds itself. Afghanistan held presidential elections in October 2004 and parliamentary elections in September 2005. President Hamid Karzai has retained relatively high levels of support. According to a December 2007 public opinion poll, for instance, 63 percent of Afghans rated the work of President Karzai positively.10
Indeed, the primary challenge in Afghanistan is one of governance. Governance includes the set of institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.11 Perhaps the most basic governance challenge in Afghanistan is security. A recent assessment from Afghanistan’s intelligence service, the National Directorate for Security, concluded that there are too few competent Afghan forces to provide security to the population in rural areas of the country.12 The result is that key villages have fallen into the hands of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. The villages are gradually emptied of pro-government political forces and individuals. These rural areas become sanctuaries for the Taliban, and the population is left with no choice but to become sympathizers of the insurgents.

Another major challenge is corruption. Afghans have become increasingly frustrated with national and local government officials who are viewed as corrupt and self-serving. This sentiment is just as palpable in rural areas of the country as it is in the cities. There are government officials at the district, provincial, and national levels involved in drug-trafficking, who are more interested in making money than in serving their populations. Indeed, rising levels in the cultivation, production, and trafficking of poppy have undermined governance. Afghanistan has also faced challenges from outside actors, which have undermined governance. The first is a limited NATO role. Its roots hearken back to the “light footprint” approach adopted by the United States and other international actors – including the United Nations – in 2001which continues even today. The peacekeepers numbers were particularly insufficient because a number of NATO countries refused to become involved in combat operations. This practice has been referred to as “national caveats,” In addition, political leaders were reluctant to deploy their forces into violent areas because of low domestic support for combat operations. In a German Marshall Foundation poll, for example, 75 percent of Germans, 70 percent of Italians, and 72 percent of Spanish did not support the deployment of their troops for combat operations in Afghanistan.13

Unfortunately, there are no short-term solutions to Afghanistan’s challenges. Research indicates that it takes an average of 14 years for governments to defeat insurgent groups. Many also end in a draw, with neither side winning. Insurgencies can also have long tails: approximately 25 percent of insurgencies won by the government and 11 percent won by insurgents lasted more than 20 years. If one starts counting in 2002, when the Taliban began conducting limited offensive operations, history suggests that it would take on average until 2016 to win. That is a long time for many NATO countries. But it is realistic. This does not mean, however, that the US or other NATO countries need to – or should – win the insurgency for Afghans. While outside actors often play an important role, victory is usually a function of the struggle between the local government and insurgents. First, outside forces are unlikely to remain for the duration of any counterinsurgency effort, at least as a major combatant force. Since indigenous forces eventually have to win the war on their own, they must develop the capacity to do so. If they don’t develop this capacity, indigenous forces are likely to lose the war once international assistance ends. Second, indigenous forces usually know the population and terrain better than external actors, and are better able to gather intelligence. Third, a lead outside role may be interpreted by the population as an occupation, eliciting nationalist reactions that impede success. Fourth, a lead indigenous role can provide a focus for national aspirations and show the population that they – and not foreign forces – control their destiny.


US POLICY AND ROLE
America's prior nation-building experiences suggest that external aid has a limited effect in the reconstruction of so-called failed states. Afghanistan provides a model for a broader policy framework wherein American intervention would be confined to eliminating national security threats rather than getting entangled in counterproductive nation-building exercises around the globe. The U.S. military forces currently operating in Afghanistan should concentrate on smashing the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants that are regrouping along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Once this goal is achieved, U.S. forces need not remain in the nation. Following the end of military operations, the focus could then shift to monitoring Afghanistan and its neighbours to ensure that forces that threaten the United States are not resurrected.

The current insurgency in Afghanistan does not arise from a profound disaffection among large elements of the Afghan population with their government. This insurgency has been raised in Pakistan, but individual’s resident in Pakistan, some of whom are refugees from Afghanistan, others who are native Pakistanis. For the tens of millions of Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of the current border, the distinction between Afghan and Pakistani is, indeed, of little import, as neither they, nor the government of Afghanistan, for that matter, recognize the current border between the two countries as legitimate.

In order to undertake the challenge, the old cold war mindset deserves a re look. There seems to be a view that a relentless attack against Islamic insurgents wherever they surface should be waged. The view is as seemingly logical as the Cold War belief in a worldwide communist conspiracy for global domination — and just as wrong. The belief is also harmful, for four major reasons. First, as in the Cold War, the belief in a global insurgency can lead the United States to make local commitments on the basis of vague overarching global principles. This commits America to send more troops, sustain greater military casualties, and spend more money than it possibly could in multiple conflicts at times and place of the insurgents' choosing. Second, a U.S.-led global counterinsurgency makes it more difficult for the United States to defeat insurgencies. Successful counterinsurgents fight as patriots in the service of their own country — not as United States clients. Third, equipping Americans with a mindset that places prominence on the global common features of insurgencies at the expense of fine-textured local features makes the U.S. military less effective in combating insurgencies. Fourth, belief in a global counterinsurgency leads to mismanagement of counterinsurgency campaigns because it undercuts the leadership of governments allied with the United States and of American military commanders battling an insurgency.

Hence, keeping these lessons in mind, a collective effort must be made to invigorate the global war on terror. In order to energize the global war on terror certain steps could be taken which may be enumerated as under:
 Updating the UN Charter and breaking the Definitional Impasse on
Terrorism
 Launch Operation Global Peace
 Transform the global war as a truly UN led war
 OIC, Russia and China be taken on board
 Declare 2009 and 2010 as Years to Combat Global Terror
 Centralized Control and Coordination HQ be set up for Regional Operations
 Disrupt financing of Terrorist Networks
 Ostracize Fence Sitters
 Wage a War of Ideas

CONCLUSIONS
The lesson for the United States and NATO is stark. They will win or lose Afghanistan in the rural villages and districts of the country, not in the capital city of Kabul. And if they are to win, they must begin by understanding the local nature of the insurgency.
As we are seeing today in Iraq and Afghanistan, America has been unable to defeat insurgencies with the sheer power of the U.S. military. Ultimately it will be the local conditions, population, unique features and personalities of each nation that will determine the outcome of the insurgencies against the U.S.-backed governments. The larger lesson is to retain the clarity of a "local" versus "global" perspective in dealing with the future insurgency challenge. Viewing the Taliban as nothing more than a highly radicalized vision of Islam, and viewing all Taliban as terrorists, misses the shared Pashtun tribal ethnicity of the insurgency and the family and clan ties that are stronger than any ties to the central government.

It should take effective steps which could contribute in its peacekeeping efforts. First the United States should intensify quite efforts to encourage both India and Pakistan to resolve their differences over Kashmir, that dispute being the root cause of radicalization in Pakistani society and governments use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Second, the assistance programs need to address the economic and social needs of the Pashtun populations on both sides of the border, not just in Afghanistan. There is only limited benefit in winning the hearts and minds of Pashtuns resident in Afghanistan if the larger number of Pashtuns living in Pakistan remain hostile and ungoverned. Third, there is a need to encourage both the Afghan and Pakistani governments to establish an agreed border regime and legitimize the current frontier. American efforts alone, no matter how intense and skilful, will not be sufficient to achieve any of these objectives. An effective strategy is badly needed to involve Afghanistan’s neighbours and regional powers in a renewed effort to end the war.
It should be clearly understood that if one’s only tool is the hammer, it would not serve the purpose every time. In the changing world, the US badly needs some new tools. Only then it will be able to face the challenge it has undertaken.
REFERENCES:
1. Seth G Jones, “The State of the Afghan Insurgency”, Testimony presented before the Canadian Senate National Security and Defence Committee on December 10, 2007, Rand Corporation, CA, 2007, p. 2
2. National Intelligence Council, The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2007), p. 5.
3. no.1, p. 4
4. Marc Kaufman, “U.S. Role Shifts As Afghanistan Founders,” Washington Post, April 14, 2003.
5. Greg Grant, “Govexec.com: Tribal War: Taliban 2.0,”Council on Foreign Relations, NY, March 1, 2007
6. Greg Grant, ggrant@govexec.com Government Executive March 1, 2007, p.1
7. Ibid, p.3
8. Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, in an Interview with Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for International and Strategic Studies, “Cordesman : Despite Gains, Future in Iraq, Afghanistan Remains ‘Uncertain”, Council on Foreign Relations, NY, January 14, 2008, p. 3
9. Subodh Atal, “At a Crossroads in Afghanistan Should the United States Be Engaged in Nation Building?,” CATO Institute’ Washington, D.C., Foreign Policy Briefings, No.81 September 24, 2003, p.3
10. ABC News / BBC / ARD, Afghanistan – Where Things Stand (Kabul: ABC News / BBC / ARD, December 2007), p. 16.
11. World Bank, Governance Matters 2006: Worldwide Governance Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), p. 2.
12. no.1, p. 5
13. German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo (Italy), Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2007 (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, 2007), p. 33.